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The civil penalty is the prime sanction in the United States Coast
Guard's law enforcement programs. There have been numerous efforts to
describe the impact of civil penalties on entities involved in the legal
compliance process. These efforts have resulted in the development of
economic models, few of which have been tested with actual data, and none
of which have been tested in a Coast Guard environment.
This thesis analyzes Coast Guard civil penalty data to validate a
basic economic model. An entity perceives an expected cost of non-
compliance based on the probability of detection and the penalty assessed
if detected. This is compared to the cost of compliance and the entity,
as a rational actor, choses the least expensive alternative.
The data analysis indicates support for the basic model as well as
the hypothesis that increasing the enforcement activity raises the cost




II. FRAMEWORK FOR PENALTY ASSESSMENT 12
A. INTRODUCTION 12
B. MISSIONS 12
C. THE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 15
1. MEP Statutes and Regulations 15
2. RBS Statutes and Regulations 18
a. Numbering/Certificate Regulations 21
b. Safety Equipment Regulations 22
c. Navigation Equipment Regulations 23
3. Civil Penalty Proceedings in the Coast Guard 23
D. SUMMARY - 27
III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF CIVIL PENALTY ASSESSMENT - -- 28
A. REVIEW OF PRIOR WORK — 28
1. Report of the Administrative Conference 28
2. Harvard Law Review, 1979 30
3. Becker, 1968 - 32
4. Ehrlich, 1973 34
5. Goldberg and Nold, 1980 35
6. Polinsky and Shavell , 1979 36
7. Block, Nold and Sidak, 1981 38
B. APPLICATION TO THE COAST GUARD 39
1. The Statutes and Regulations 39
2. The Entity 40
5

3. Coast Guard Activity 42
4. Other Considerations 43
C. TEST OF THE BASIC MODEL 45
D. SUMMARY 47
IV. DATA ANALYSIS - 48
A. DATA RECORDS - 48
1. The Case Files 49
a. RBS Case Files — - 49
b. MEP Case Files — - - 51
2. Violation Activity Measurement 53
3. Enforcement Activity 55
a. RBS Activity 56
b. MEP Activity 56
B. DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 57
1. Penalty Assessment Policy 57
2. Violation Activity Measurement 60
3. Enforcement Activity 60
C. DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 61
1. RBS Data Analysis Results 61
2. MEP Data Analysis Results 64
D. SUMMARY 56
V. CONCLUSIONS — 68
APPENDIX A VIOLATION CASE FLOW 72
APPENDIX B STUDY AREA MAP 73
APPENDIX C REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 74
APPENDIX D POLICY COMPARISONS 79

APPENDIX E RECREATIONAL BOATING SAFETY DATA — 85
APPENDIX F MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DATA 88
LIST OF REFERENCES — 91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST - - 94

I. INTRODUCTION
The use and effectiveness of civil penalties in law enforcement pro-
grams is widely recognized and encouraged wherever the primary intent of
the program is deterrence [Ref. 1]. The United States (U.S.) Coast Guard
(hereinafter Coast Guard) has many deterrence-oriented law enforcement
programs founded on statutes that provide civil penalty sanctions. In
these law enforcement programs, civil penalties are assessed for viola-
tions of U.S. statutes and/or regulations that the Coast Guard enforces
and for which a proper civil penalty case has been submitted.
Violation cases are initiated by Coast Guard field units that have
some responsibility for specific law enforcement programs. The violation
cases are then submitted by the field units to their respective program
managers on the staff of the District Commander. There are 13 Coast
Guard Districts each encompassing a specific geographic area of the
United States. It is the Commander of each Coast Guard District who has
the responsibility to process the violation case through his or her
program manager and ensure a penalty is assessed where warranted. The
penalty assessment authority is delegated to a member of the District
Commander's staff entitled the "Hearing Officer" [Ref. 2]. A chart is
presented in Appendix A which delineates the violation case flow up to
the Hearing Officer using the organization of the Coast Guard District
Office in the study area.
The author's research indicated that there exist no unilateral guide-
lines generated within the Coast Guard concerned with Hearing Officer

qualifications or how the Hearing Officer should weigh all factors in
determining an appropriate penalty. The sole unilateral guidance to
Hearing Officers comes from the Federal Regulations that create the
authority for penalty assessment. However, the guidance is of a very
general nature. Typical wording from the regulations that gives some
guidance is that the Hearing Officer shall make "fair and impartial
decisions" and shall assess an "appropriate penalty" [Ref. 3]. Nowhere
is there a discussion of the numerous economic models developed to
describe the law compliance process and the impact of civil penalties on
the goals of the various law enforcement programs.
As will be developed herein, the primary goal of any civil penalty
law enforcement program is deterrence. Deterrence is primarily a func-
tion of the amount of the penalty for not complying with a statute or
regulation and the probability that the violation will be detected [Ref.
4]. The probability of detection relates in large part to the enforcing
agency's activity. Activity as used herein means the physical efforts by
the agency to enforce statutes or regulations, such as patrols or in-
spections. It is important to realize that there are two ways then to
deter would-be violators. An agency can either increase enforcement
activity, and thus the probability of detection, or it can increase the
penalty for those violations detected. The option to increase enforce-
ment activity carries resource costs to the enforcing agency. The option
to increase the level of penalties assessed against violators carries no
additional cost to the enforcing agency, but certainly increases the
costs to the violator. The Coast Guard, like any agency, may be able to
obtain a constant compliance level from those it regulates even in view
of budget cuts and resultant decreases in enforcement activity.
9

Hearing Officers need to know that civil penalties should be assessed
at, or at least towards, some optimum level so that the greatest deter-
rence is obtained for the number of law enforcement resources employed.
They need to be made aware of how entities view the law compliance
decision. Before any guidance is given, however, a test to validate the
economic models describing the law compliance process is needed. The
author contends that this test would be much more valuable to the Coast
Guard if it were conducted using Coast Guard data collected from a Coast
Guard environment.
It is the intent of this thesis to examine Coast Guard data and test
the numerous economic models that describe the law compliance decision
process. The thesis will first discuss the relevant law enforcement
programs of the Coast Guard and the specific statutes and regulations
contained in those programs relevant to this effort. Secondly, a pre-
sentation will be made of previous efforts in developing economic models
to describe the decision process of compliance. Thirdly, a description
of the Coast Guard data obtained and the statistical techniques used in
the data analysis will be presented. Finally, conclusions will be stated
about the results of the data analysis in light of the assumptions made.
A final point should be addressed before proceeding with the in-
vestigation. There rarely exist circumstances in real life that are
controlled enough to allow for a definitive test of any economic model of
the compliance decision process. The single thing most often lacking is
a varying level of assessed penalty for the same violation and the oppor-
tunity to examine the difference in impact from the different levels [Ref.
5]. The author feels it would be unethical and impractical to conduct
10

real life experiments on alleged violators when real costs are being
incurred. In the Coast Guard and specifically the Eleventh Coast Guard
District, both a change in Hearing Officers and a moderate change in the
rules governing the civil penalty assessment process occurred simulta-
neously [Ref. 6]. A result of this, though perhaps not a causative
result, was that different civil penalty assessment policies existed in
adjacent time periods. This provides a unique opportunity to test the
hypotheses presented by many economic models about how entities view the
compliance process and how they react to different levels of penalty
assessment.
The Coast Guard District selected for this analysis was the Eleventh
Coast Guard District. This District is headquartered in Long Beach,
California, and extends along the Pacific Coast from the Mexican border
to the Santa Maria River, and extends inland to include the Colorado
River. Appendix B graphically portrays the Eleventh Coast Guard District.
The time frame of the analysis, which was somewhat restricted by the
availability of data, begins in January, 1978 and continues to September,
1981. As will be discussed, there are more precise dates depending on
which law enforcement program is being analyzed. The analysis will show
how the penalties assessed varied between regimes of Hearing Officers.
The first effort of the data analysis will be to show just how much
different the assessed penalties were under each Hearing Officer and to
examine the number of violations detected under each Hearing Officer.
Efforts which follow will be towards accounting for differences in en-
forcement activity existant under each Hearing Officer. This considers
then both the amount of the assessed penalty and the probability that the
violation would have been detected.
11

II. FRAMEWORK FOR PENALTY ASSESSMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will first describe the relevant Coast Guard missions
and related law enforcement programs. For reasons that will be address-
ed, only two of these programs will be considered in the analysis. Next,
the specific statutes and regulations, for which violations were con-
sidered in this analysis, will be presented. Finally, the regulations
from which the Coast Guard derives its authority to assess penalties, and
also gives some limited guidance to the Hearing Officer, will be
discussed.
B. MISSIONS
The Coast Guard has numerous missions. Of these, four are strictly
law enforcement missions and are primarily deterrence-oriented. While
there are other missions in the Coast Guard that do involve some law
enforcement activity, they are not primarily oriented towards that end.
The title and objective of these four missions is listed below as
extracted from "The U.S. Coast Guard: Its Missions and Objectives"
(1978): [Ref. 7]
Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) - The primary objective is to
maintain or improve the quality of the marine environment through
preventive measures. The secondary objective is to minimize the
damage caused by pollutants discharged into the marine environment by
providing coordinated and effective response to remove discharges of
oil or hazardous substances. Congress has established, through en-
acted statutes, the restorations and maintenance of the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters as a
national objective. The Coast Guard is the primary maritime agency
empowered to meet this national objective. The role for the Coast
12

Guard in marine environmental protection is a logical extension of
its traditional missions in marine law enforcement.
Port Safety and Security (PSS) - The objective is to safeguard the
nation's navigable waters and adjacent shore areas, including ports
and their related facilities, from accidental or intentional harm. By
assuring the safety of the ports and waterways and of persons and
property nearby, the utilization of these vital marine transportation
links is facilitated. Early legislation had limited this program to
those periods of time during which the President declared a state of
national emergency or made a finding that the security of the U.S.
was endangered. More recent legislation enlarged the scope of the
program and gave it permanence by authorizing it in all times.
Recreational Boating Safety (RBS) - The objective is to reduce the
risk of loss of life, personal injury, and property damage associated
with the use of recreational boats in order to provide boaters with
maximum safe use of the nation's waterways. This program incorpo-
rates a variety of activities directed towards the stated objective
and integrates Coast Guard efforts with those of the Coast Guard
Auxiliary, Power Squadron, Red Cross, and State and local governments.
The Coast Guard provides financial assistance to the States to admin-
ister their approved boating safety programs.
Commercial Vessel Safety (CVS) - The objective is to minimize deaths,
personal injuries, and property loss or damage in the marine environ-
ment associated with the design, construction, and manning of
merchant vessels and with their cargoes. The roots of this program
go back to the first half of the nineteenth century when the first
CVS legislation was enacted. This program had been administered in
part by other organizations but in 1946, the administration of the
program was permanently transferred in its entirety to the Coast
Guard. After 1946, additional legislative authority had broadened
the scope of the program. The Coast Guard exercises jurisdiction
primarily over U.S. vessels but also conducts a program for foreign
vessels which is based on international treaties.
Each law enforcement program described is founded on statutes enacted
by Congress. A statute is legislated law designed to prohibit something
or declare something to be illegal [Ref. 8]. Often a statute cannot
specify in great detail what is to be prohibited or declared illegal. As
a result, the statute will assign to the Executive Department the respon-
sibility to create regulations under the authority of the law. Strictly
speaking, "regulate" and "legislate" (as in a statute) are not synonymous.
13

To regulate means to supervise or exercise authority [Ref. 9]. Nonethe-
less, regulations carry the same weight as law and have the same penalty
provisions. For all intents and purposes, the person who must decide
whether or not to comply with all legal requirements cannot differentiate
between a statute or a regulation. Similarly, the enforcing agency makes
no differentiation in its treatment of statutes and regulations.
The large majority of the statutes and regulations which are the
cornerstone of the Coast Guard law enforcement programs carry a civil
penalty provision. Some also carry criminal provisions. There is con-
siderable difference between the two types of provisions. A criminal
provision requires a trial by jury or other formal proceedings for a
person to be found guilty. In addition, a criminal provision may allow
for restriction of freedom and/or a criminal fine. A civil penalty pro-
vision on the other hand only provides for one thing, namely the assess-
ment of a penalty. A civil penalty is simply a liability created such
that the person against whom the penalty is assessed is liable to the
U.S. Government for the amount of the penalty. A civil penalty can be
assessed in informal administrative proceedings and takes a great burden
off the court system. There are no requirements for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt but rather a determination of sufficient evidence is
required [Ref. 10]. A more detailed discussion of civil penalties will
be deferred until later in this thesis.
This analysis will be limited to the MEP and RBS law enforcement
programs. The data available in the CVS and PSS programs was insuffi-
cient for a detailed analysis. The lack of sufficient data related to
the structure of the violations processed in the four programs. The MEP
14

and RBS Taw enforcement programs process very structured, simple, and
repetitive type violations in great volume. The CVS and PSS law enforce-
ment programs process much more complex and unstructured violations and
do so in far fewer numbers, thus providing insufficient data.
C. THE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
The statutes and regulations of the MEP and RBS law enforcement
programs used in this analysis will now be discussed in detail. The
rules which create the process by which the Coast Guard assesses civil
penalties will also be discussed.
1 . MEP Statutes and Regulations
The MEP law enforcement program is, in fact, based largely on a
single statute. There are regulations promulgated under that and other
statutes but sufficient data in the study area existed only for analysis
of the statute itself. The statute as enacted was known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 1972. The statute was further
amended in 1978 and is now entitled the Clean Water Act [Ref. 11]. The
statute was codified in the United States Code (USC) in Title 33-Navi-
gation and Navigable Waters. That portion of the statute applicable to
the Coast Guard is contained in section 1321. (Note: this statute is
also enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). A line which
defines coastal and inland waters has been developed. The EPA is
responsible for incidents in inland waters. The Coast Guard is the
primary enforcement agency for coastal waters but often participates in
inland water incidents also.)
15

The Clean Water Act begins with a statement of policy:
33 USC 1321(b)(1) - "The Congress hereby declares that it is the
policy of the United States that there should be no discharges of oil
or hazardous substances into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of
the contiguous zone, or in connection with activities under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 USC 1331 et. seq. ) or which may
affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the
exclusive management authority of the United States."
In addition to assigning responsibility to both the Coast Guard and the
Environmental Protection Agency for the development of regulations
designed to prevent discharges of oil or hazardous substances, the Clean
Water Act makes a statement about the illegality of polluting the waters
affected by the statute:
33 USC 1321(b)(3) - "The discharge of oil or hazardous substances
into or upon the navigable waters of the Unites States, adjoining
shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone, ....
in such quantities as may be harmful as determined by the President
... is prohibited.
"
In this analysis, no cases of prohibited discharges of hazardous
substances were encountered. All cases analyzed dealt solely with pro-
hibited discharges of oil. It is also important here to point out that
the term "harmful quantity" has in fact been defined in the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR). Harmful quantity is defined in Title 40 of
the Code of Federal Regulations-Protection %f the Environment: [Ref. 12]
40 CFR 110.3 - "For purposes of .... the Act, discharges of such
quantities of oil into or upon the navigable waters of the United
States or adjoining shorelines determined to be harmful to the public
health or welfare of the United States, at all times and locations
and under all circumstances and conditions, except as provided in...
part, include discharges which:
(a) Violate applicable water quality standards, or
(b) Cause a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of
the water or adjoining shorelines or cause a sludge or emulsion





In the cases analyzed, the second standard for harmful quantity was used
exclusively to establish a harmful quantity. It is not difficult to
understand why. An investigating officer need only state that he or she
observed a sheen or discoloration upon the water. Proving violation of a
certain water standard is much more difficult. These standards are often
stated as parts of pollutant per million parts of water and require the
water/pollutant mix to be analyzed in a laboratory.
The Clean Water Act describes other illegal acts such as report-
ing requirements that require a discharger who has knowledge of his or
her illegal act to report it to the appropriate government office. The
Act further describes other actions which are illegal and are also
criminal. The simple act of discharging oil in violation of 33 USC 1321
(b)(3) without willful intent is a civil violation and carries a civil
penalty provision. This provision is defined in the statute:
33 USC 1321(b)(6)(A) - "Any owner, operator, or person in charge of
any onshore facility or offshore facility from which oil or a hazard-
ous substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3) of this
subsection shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating of not more than
$5,000 for each offense. Any operator, owner, or person in charge of
any vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in
violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection, ... shall be assessed
a civil penalty by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast
Guard is operating of not more than $5,000 for each offense. No
penalty shall be assessed unless the owner or operator charged shall
have been given notice and opportunity for a hearing on such charge.
Any such penalty may be compromised by such Secretary. In deter-
mining the amount of the penalty, or the amount agreed upon in com-
promise, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the
business of the owner or operator charged, the effect on the owner or
operator's ability to continue business, and the gravity of the
violation shall be considered."
There are important aspects of this civil penalty provision that
should be discussed. First, the authority to assess penalties has been
17

delegated to the Coast Guard District Commanders. This delegation is
contained in 33 CFR 1 [Ref. 13]. Further delegation to the Hearing
Officer will be discussed later in this chapter. Second, the terms on-
shore and offshore facility have taken on the broadest form, as has
already the term vessel. The statute seems to narrow the type of sources
from which a prohibited discharge can emanate by use of the terms
facility and vessel. Nonetheless, their definition is now so broad that
the investigating officer need not be concerned with the aspect. If all
other aspects of a violation are present, it matters not what the source
was. If it is identifiable, a case may be made against it.
Finally, it is rare that a statute mandates a penalty where a
violation has occurred, but the Clean Water Act has done so in the wording
"... shall be assessed ..." Certainly there are many considerations in
determining an appropriate penalty and the statute specifies some, e.g.,
gravity of the violation and financial impact of the penalty. Nonethe-
less, even in the most faultless incidents, even where the discharger is
financially destitute, a penalty, however small, must be assessed.
2. RBS Statutes and Regulations
The various legal requirements under this program were greatly
unified with the passing of the Federal Boating Safety Act of 1971, the
main statute of the RBS law enforcement program [Ref. 14]. Unlike the
MEP law enforcement program, the large majority of legal requirements are
contained in regulations rather than in the statute itself. The statute
itself will first be examined and then the specific and detailed regu-
lations themselves will be presented.
18

The Federal Boating Safety Act of 1971 was codified into the
United States Code (USC) in title 46-Shipping in sections 1451-1489. The
Act starts out with a policy statement:
46 USC 1451 - "It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress and
the purpose of this chapter to improve boating safety and to foster
greater development, use, and enjoyment of all the waters of the
United States by encouraging and assisting participation by the
several States, the boating industry, and the boating public in
development of more comprehensive boating safety programs; by author-
izing the establishment of national construction and performance
standards for boats and associated equipment; and by creating more
flexible regulatory authority concerning the use of boats and equip-
ment. It is further declared to be the policy of Congress to en-
courage greater and continuing uniformity of boating laws and regu-
lations as among the several States and the Federal Government, a
higher degree of reciprocity and comity among the several jurisdic-
tions, and closer cooperation and assistance between the Federal
Government and the several States in developing, administering, and
enforcing Federal and State laws and regulations pertaining to boat-
ing safety."
It is interesting to note how the Congress had actually encouraged en-
forcement of the Federal standards by the States. This did not material-
ize to the extent desired and the Coast Guard remains the primary boating
safety law enforcement agency.
The Act further describes the applicability of the various
requirements:
46 USC 1453(a) - "This chapter applies to vessels and associated
equipment used, to be used, or carried in vessels used, on water
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and on the high seas
beyond the territorial seas for vessels owned in the United States."
As with the Clean Water Act, responsibility is assigned for the creation
of regulations that implement portions of the statute. Much of this act
has to do with the manufacture for sale of boats and related equipment.
This thesis will be interested only in the operational requirements for




With respect to the responsibility of the Secretary of the De-
partment in which the Coast Guard is operating:
46 USC 1454(a)(2) - "The Secretary may issue regulations requiring
the installation, carrying, or using of associated equipment on boats
and classes of boats subject to this chapter; and using of associated
equipment which does not conform with safety standards established
under this section."
Certainly there have been regulations issued under the authority
of this provision as well as previously established regulations adopted
under the authority of the Act. Before those regulations are examined,
it is appropriate that two more sections of the Act be presented. The
first deals with one boating requirement that is stated in the statute
itself. It deals with the negligent operation of a boat:
46 USC 1461(d) - "No person may use a vessel, including one otherwise
exempted...., in a negligent manner so as to endanger the life, limb,
or property of any person. Violations of this subsection involving
use which is grossly negligent, subject the violator, in addition to
any other penalties prescribed in this chapter, to the criminal
penalties prescribed in section 1483 of this title."
The second part of the Act that should be reviewed is section 1484 which
provides for civil penalties and considerations in assessing an appropri-
ate penalty:
46 USC 1484(b) - "In addition to any other penalty prescribed by law,
any person who violates a provision of this chapter or the regula-
tions issued thereunder, shall be liable to a civil penalty of not
more than $500 for each violation. If the violation involved the use
(emphasis added) of a vessel, the vessel, .... shall be liable and
may be proceeded against in the district courts...."
46 USC 1848(c) - "The Secretary may assess and collect any civil
penalty incurred under this chapter and, in his discretion, remit,
mitigate, or compromise any penalty prior to referral to the Attorney
General. In determining the amount of any penalty to be assessed
hereunder, or the amount agreed upon in any compromise, consideration
shall be given to tne appropriateness of such penalty in light of the
size of the business of the person charged, the gravity of the vio-
lations, and the extent to which the person charged has complied with
the provisions of section 1464 of this title or has otherwise at-
tempted to remedy the consequences of the said violation."
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The authority to assess penalties has been delegated to the Coast Guard
District Commanders in 33 CFR 1 just as it was delegated for the Clean
Water Act. Also, the term "use" should be examined. It is defined as
"operate, navigate, or employ" [Ref. 15].
The presentation of the specific regulations will be by groups.
There will be three in all. They include numbering/certificate regu-
lations, safety equipment regulations, and navigation equipment regu-
lations. The regulations appear to use the terms vessel and motorboat
interchangeably. This need not be of concern though at times, each has a
very restricted meaning. The use of different terms reflects different
statutes enacted at various times in history when statute writing was not
as demanding as it is today.
a. Numbering/Certificate Regulations
Numbering and certification requirements are contained in
Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 173 (33 CFR 173) [Ref 16].
The basic numbering provisions is stated thus:
33 CFR 173.15(a) - "Except as exempted, no person may use a vessel to
which this part applies unless-
(1) It has a number issued on a certificate of number by the
issuing authority in the State in which the vessel is principally
used; and
(2) The number is displayed as required "
The basic certification requirement, referred to as Certificate of Number,
is stated thus:
33 CFR 173.21(a) - "Exempt as expted, no person may use a vessel to
which this part applies unless it has on board-
(1) A valid certificate of number ; or
(2) ....a copy of the lease or rental agreement, signed by the
owner or his authorized representative and by the person leasing
or renting the vessel."
21

Further, the Certificate of Number is required to be on board and avail-
able for inspection:
33 CFR 173.23 - "Each person using a vessel to which this part
applies shall present the certificate or lease or rental agreement
required by section 173.21 to any Federal, State, or local law en-
forcement officer for inspection at his request."
33 CFR 173.25 - "No person may use a vessel to which this part
applies unless the certificate or lease or rental agreement required
by section 173.21 is carried on board in such a manner that it can be
handed to a person authorized under section 173.23.
These regulations were developed under the Federal Boating Safety Act and
carry the same penalty provisions of the Act itself,
b. Safety Equipment Regulations
The safety equipment regulations pertain to both personal
safety equipment and boat safety equipment. They are simple straight-
forward requirements and will be listed here without comment: [Ref 17]
46 CFR 25.25(b), (c) & (d) - "Each vessel ... must have at least one
life preserver, buoyant vest, or special purpose water safety buoynat
device intended to be worn, approved under Subchapter Q, of a suit-
able size for each person on board. Further, each vessel 26 feet in
length must have at least one approved ring life buoy."
46 CFR 25.30 - "Each vessel ... shall carry at least the minimum
number of hand portable fire extinguishers set forth in Table 25,
30-20(a)(l)."
46 CFR 25.35 - "Every gasoline engine installed in a motorboat or
motor vessel ... shall be equipped with an acceptable means of back-
fire flame control as specified in part 25. 35- 1(e)."
46 CFR 25. 40-1 (a) - "All motorboats or motor vessels, ... shall have
at least two ventilator ducts, fitted with cowls or their equivalent,
for the efficient removal of explosive or flammable gases from the
bilges of every engine and fuel tank compartment. There shall be at
least one exhaust duct installed so as to extend from the open atmos-
phere to the lower portion of the bilge and at least one intake duct
installed so as to extend to a point at least midway to the bilge or
at least below the level of the carburetor intaKe. The cowls shall
be located and trimmed for maximum effectiveness and in such a manner
so as to prevent displaced fumes from being recirculated."
22

Since these regulations were adopted under the Federal Boating Safety
Act, the penalty provisions for the regulations are the same as the
provision of the Act itself.
c. Navigation Equipment Regulations
The navigation equipment regulations are somewhat unique in
that a single regulation adopts an entire set of separate requirements
[Ref. 18]:
46 CFR 25.02-l(a) - "Each vessel including motorboats, .... must be
equipped with the navigation lights and shapes, whistles, bells, and
gongs required by the International Regulations for Preventing Colli-
sions at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS)."
The specific types of equipment need not be spelled out here as the
regulation describes the general types of equipment of concern.
3. Civil Penalty Proceedings in the Coast Guard
The rules for the conduct of civil penalty proceedings are
written as Federal Regulations and are codified in Title 33 of the Code
of Federal Regulations. These rules were modified in 1978 [Ref. 19].
Prior to that time, civil penalties were assessed by division or branch
chiefs on the staff of a Coast Guard District Commander. These division
or branch chiefs were also and primarily responsible for the execution of
their specific law enforcement programs, hence their common title of
"program managers." The modification proscribed any involvement by the
program managers in the civil penalty assessment process. The stated
reasons for the change included the need for a more comprehensible
process for the assessment of civil penalties and a more definitive set
of time limits within which action must be taken. Though not stated as a
reason for this modification, the change did take control of penalty
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assessment out of the hands of the program managers. While civil penalty
actions take a tremendous burden off the government because court trial
requirements are waived in favor of informal administrative proceedings,
fairness and the rights of the individual are still of paramount import-
ance [Ref. 20]. It is not hard to imagine that a program manager might
subconsciously give greater credance to Coast Guard evidence, than
evidence presented by the alleged violator.
Plainly, there were two different sets of rules which existed in
the time period of the analysis. In the first part of the analysis, the
program managers were responsible for penalty assessment. In the second
part, the Hearing Officer, someone with no connection whatsoever with the
case, alleged violator or the enforcement resources, was responsible for
civil penalty assessment. These rules may or may not have accounted for
any difference in penalty assessment policies. This is not important,
however. It is assumed that the individual, or other entity, is not
concerned with why a penalty assessment policy is as it is, but rather
his or her sole interest is simply what the policy is.
The new rules specify how violations of statutes and/or regula-
tions may be reported. (Note: the term District Commander as used herein
refers to that Coast Guard Officer who is in charge of a certain geo-
graphical area of the U.S. as well as the execution of the law enforce-
ment programs. It is his or her staff that receives investigative
reports of violations from Coast Guard field units and prepares them for
submission to the Hearing Officer.)
33 CFR 1 . 07- 10(a) - "Any person may report an apparent violation of
any law, regulation, or order that is enforced by the Coast Guard to
any Coast Guard facility. When a report is received of an apparent
24

violation, or when an apparent violation has been detected by any
Coast Guard personnel, the matter is investigated or evaluated by
Coast Guard personnel."
It should be noted, however, that the Coast Guard does process a small
number of violations of the Clean Water Act that are investigated and
written up by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). No cases
originated by the EPA were used in the analysis, however. These cases
are few in number and often involve a much different type of entity than
do the cases investigated by the Coast Guard. This is mainly because EPA
cases involve prohibited discharges of oil that occur inland and there is
less opportunity for a violation there. Since there existed so few
cases, it was felt that factors unique to these cases could not accu-
rately be accounted for in the analysis.
The rules create a position entitled "Hearing Officer." A
Hearing Officer is a Coast Guard officer or employee who has been dele-
gated the authority to assess civil penalties. The rules specify certain
restrictions on the Hearing Officer:
33 CFR 1 . 07- 15(b) - "The Hearing Officer decides each case on the
basis of the evidence before him, and must have no prior connection
with the case. The Hearing Officer is solely responsible for the
decision in each case referred to him."
After a Hearing Officer has been in place for six months or so, it is
highly unlikely he or she could have had any connection with the case.
The rules specify certain actions upon receipt of an investi-
gative report of violation:
33 CFR 1.07-20 - (a) "When a case is received for action, the Hearing
Officer makes a preliminary examination of the material submitted.
If, on the basis of the preliminary examination, the Hearing Officer
determines that there is insufficient evidence to proceed, or that
there is any other reason which would make penalty action inappro-
priate, the Hearing Officer returns the case to the Coast Guard
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District Commander with a written statement of the reason. (b) If on
the basis of the preliminary examination of the case file, the
Hearing Officer determines that a violation appears to have been
committed, the Hearing Officer notifies the party in writing of:
(1) The alleged violation and the applicable law or regulation;
(2) The amount of the maximum penalty that may be assessed for
each violation;
(3) The general nature of the procedure for assessing and col-
lecting the penalty;
(4) The amount of penalty that appears to be appropriate, based
on the material then available to the Hearing Officer;
(5) The right to examine all materials in the case file and have
a copy of all written documents provided upon request; and
(6) The fact that the party may demand a hearing prior to any
actual assessment of a penalty."
The next action in the process is for the alleged violator to act
on the notification:
33 CFR 1.07-25 - (a) "Within 30 days after receipt of notice of the
initiation of the action, the alleged violator may request a hearing,
provide information for the Hearing Officer to consider in final
resolution of the case, or pay the amount specified in the notice.
(b) The right to a hearing is waived if the alleged violator does not
respond within 30 days."
The manner in which an alleged violator presents his or her side of the
story, either at a hearing or in correspondence, is largely irrelevant.
The rules provide for either method, however.
Once the Hearing Officer has information from the alleged vio-
lator or the alleged violator has not responded, the Hearing Officer
makes a decision in the case:
33 CFR 1.07-65 - (a) "The Hearing Officer must issue a written
decision. Any decision to assess a penalty is based upon substantial
evidence in the record. If the Hearing Officer finds that there is
not substantial evidence in the record establishing the alleged
violation or some other violation of which the party had full and
fair notice, the Hearing Officer shall dismiss the case and remand it
to the District Commander. (b) If the Hearing Officer assesses a
penalty, the Hearing Officer's decision must also inform the violator
of his right to appeal and how to effect an appeal."




33 CFR 107-75 - "Upon receipt of an appeal, the Hearing Officer
provides the District Commander an opportunity to submit written
comments on the appeal. The appeal is then forwarded within 20 days
to the Commandant of the Coast Guard for final determination."
The remainder of the rules specify collection actions for delin-
quent penalties and procedures for reopening hearings when new evidence
is discovered that could affect the outcome of the case.
0. SUMMARY
This chapter laid the foundation for the analysis. The relevant
missions of the Coast Guard have been presented and the reasons for
selecting the RBS and MEP programs for analysis addressed. The statutes
and regulations involved in the analysis were presented as well as
regulations that create and structure the civil penalty assessment
process in the Coast Guard. All factors which must be considered in
determining an appropriate penalty have been identified. It is now
appropriate to discuss how individual entities examine the requirements
of the law and make their compliance decision.
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III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF CIVIL PENALTY ASSESSMENT
This chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section
is both a review of the basis for the civil penalty as an enforcement
tool as well as a review of significant work done on creating economic
models to describe the legal compliance decision process. In the second
section, the application of these models to the Coast Guard civil penalty
assessment process will be examined. The third section discusses the
test of the basic model and the fourth section is a summarization.
A. REVIEW OF PRIOR WORK
The review of the prior work done in this area will be organized by
author rather than by content. Though the opposite is normally done, the
works reviewed represent a fairly comprehensive collection on the subject.
So many points are shared and the works are so often based on each other
that review by author is more appropriate. Thus, this section will




Report of the Administrative Conference [Ref. 21]
The Administrative Conference of the U.S. was created "... to
identify the causes of inefficiency, delay and unfairness in administra-
tive proceedings affecting private rights, and to recommend improvements
to the President, the agencies, the Congress, and the Courts." [Ref. 22]
The Conference is held either yearly or biyearly. The main council of
the Conference is chaired by and consists of ten presidential appointees
who serve three year terms.
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Federal administrative agencies, such as the Coast Guard, enforce
many statutory and regulatory provisions for violation of which fixed or
variable civil money penalties may be imposed. In fiscal year 1971,
seven executive departments (including the Department of Transportation,
the parent organization of the Coast Guard) and 13 independent agencies
collected well in excess of ten million dollars, in over 15,000 cases
[Ref. 23]. Indications were then, and have largely been confirmed by
present data, that both the number of cases and the dollar magnitude
would greatly increase [Ref. 24]. In fact, the "... civil money penalty
had become one of the most widely used techniques in the enforcement
programs of Federal administrative agencies ..." by 1979 [Ref 25].
The increased use of civil money penalties is an important and
salutary trend. They have also proven to be an important alternative to
criminal sanctions.
"When civil money penalties are not available, agency administrators
often voice frustration at having to render harsh all-or-nothing
decisions, sometimes adversely affecting innocent third parties, in
cases in which enforcement purposes could be better served by a more
precise measurement of culpability and a more flexible response."
[Ref. 26]
It was then envisioned that civil penalties would be especially appro-
priate in areas of safety and environmental concern, allowing an agency
to more easily attain its law enforcement goals.
The Administrative Conference recognized that there is consider-
able forethought required when creating sanctions for a new law. In many
instances, for example the Clean Water Act and the Federal Safe Boating
Act of 1971, statutes may have both criminal and civil sanctions. The
choice in sanctions both at the statute drafting stage and at the en-
forcement level has large consequences. Criminal penalties, though they
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create nothing more than a dollar liability to the government as do civil
penalties, expose an offender to the disgrace and disabilities associated
with "convictions." Criminal convictions require special procedural and
other protections and cannot be imposed administratively. The over-
burdening of the courts argues against flooding them with controversies
better handled by an administrative process [Ref. 27].
Criminal sanctions often create agency shortcuts, especially in
the form of settlements. One estimate is that over 90% of violation
cases are terminated by means of compromise, remission, or mitigation
without ever going to a formal trial. The quality of settlements is a
matter of concern. Regulatory needs are often sacrificed in light of
what is collectible. The offender, on the otherhand, may be denied his
procedural rights in a settlement [Ref. 28]. The Administrative Confer-
ence recognized the value of civil penalties and in its recommendation to
Executive Agencies, encouraged their use.
2. Harvard Law Review, 1979 [Ref. 29]
Significant analyses of civil penalties as a statutory sanction
were reported by the Harvard Law Review. Of specific interest in the
analyses were statutes that carried both civil and criminal sanctions and
the options they presented to the enforcing agency.
The reason for creating and enforcing a statute is critical to
the entire law enforcement process. It is recognized that there is a
large schism in law between criminal and civil sanctions. This was not a
random development. "The basic aim of civil sanctions is deterrence;
retribution is the province of criminal law" [Ref. 30]. Deterrence is
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especially an appropriate goal in safety and environmental law enforce-
ment programs. "Environmental sanctions ... do not emphasize retribution,
rehabilitation, or incapacitation, but rather strive chiefly to ensure
clean lakes and skies by making it undesirable to pollute in the first
place." It appears that the basic aim of statutes with civil penalty
provisions is "... not to punish morally culpable violators, but to deter
undesirable conduct regardless of culpability" [Ref. 31].
Given deterrence as a goal, a basic tenet of a system of civil
penalties would be to make it more costly to elect non-compliance than it
would to elect compliance. "In a world of perfect enforcement, the
penalty would need only be marginally greater than the profit gained by
the entity as a result of the illegal activity." There are obviously
imperfections in any law enforcement system. Not all violations can be
detected. There is some probability of detection that exists or at least
is perceived by the potential violator. That value of a civil penalty
must be discounted by that probability. The potential violator then
formulates an "expected value" of compliance and non-compliance. "For
example, if a corporation would reap $100 profit from an illegal activity,
but could be caught and punished only once out of every four times it
engaged in such conduct, then the fine for each violation should be
greater than $400" [Ref. 32].
The adoption of statutes with both civil and criminal sanctions
is an advantage to a law enforcement agency. It might be argued that a
sufficiently high level of deterrence would be achieved through assess-
ment of civil penalties and that criminal sanctions, even simple criminal
fines, are unnecessary. There are often, however, motivations that do
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not fall into simple analysis as the aforedescribed example. Individuals
may perceive intangible personal gain through illegal activity. This
type of gain may not be deterred through a civil penalty. The criminal
sanction would then still be available when needed to impose criminal
sanction on morally "blameworthy and objectionable behavior." The civil
sanction should be more than adequate for the large majority of cases,
however.
3. Becker, 1968 [Ref. 33]
Becker begins his presentation with a discussion about crime.
Two of the primary considerations in decisions about compliance are
recognized as, first, the likelihood of detection if a person choses not
to comply with the statute and/or regulations, and, second, the nature of
the punishment if convicted. Becker points out that these factors are
truly variables. An alleged offender may well encounter different pro-
babilities of detection and conviction, and different punishments in
different areas of the country. Also recognized is that obedience to the
law is not taken for granted, and public and private resources must be
expended to apprehend offenders. Becker's efforts are towards deter-
mining the optimal amount and type of resources and punishments used to
enforce a law or regulation. To this end, a formulation of the social
loss from an offense must be effected so that expenditures of resources
and punishments combine to minimize the total cost to society [Ref. 34].
A common assumption with this effort and others to follow is that
the person is basically seen as a rational actor. "The special theories
of anomie, psychological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits




Becker addresses a primary question about crime and law. "Usu-
ally, a belief that other members of society are harmed is the motivation
behind outlawing or otherwise restricting an activity. The amount of
harm tends to increase with the activity level." Becker assumes the
individual to be a member of society that benefits from an illegal
activity. The net cost or damage to society then is the difference
between the harm and the benefit [Ref. 36].
With respect to the individual entity, we again have the two
primary factors. First, the probability of detection and conviction is
formulated. Second, the cost incurred as a result of conviction is
formulated. Thus, there is a perception of expected value of non-
compliance. Becker notes that in his review of all the diverse theories
about law enforcement, there is general agreement:
"... that when other variables are held constant, an increase in a
person's probability of conviction or punishment if convicted would
generally decrease ... the number of offenses he commits. This
generalized approach follows the economists' usual analysis of choice
and assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility
to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other
resources at other activities." [Ref. 37]
It is interesting to note that people with judicial experience view
changes in probability of detection as having far greater impacts on
compliance/non-compliance decisions than changes in the costs associated
with detection and conviction [Ref. 38]. This suggests that an agency
may not be able to simply increase the cost of non-compliance to the
offender to make up for decreasing enforcement activity in the hopes of
maintaining a steady expected cost of non-compliance.
Becker then brings these considerations together. "If the aim
simply were deterrence, the probability of conviction could be raised
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close to 1.0 and punishments made to exceed the gain; in this way the
number of offenses could be reduced almost at will" [Ref. 39]. In-
creasing the probability of detection creates a cost for society because
more resources must be directed towards violation detection. What is
needed is consideration to the damages to society from the crime in
determining the proper amount of resources to devote to law enforcement.
An optimal decision on enforcement levels would be one that minimizes the
social loss. "This is the sum of damages, costs of apprehension and
conviction, and costs of carrying out the punishments imposed which can
be minimized simultaneously..." [Ref. 40].
With respect to safety and environmental law, the cost to society
of non-compliance is very difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, the con-
cept of optimization with respect to the net loss to society is an im-
portant one.
4. Ehrlich, 1973 [Ref. 41]
The primary thrust of Ehrlich's work is the development of a
theory of participation in illegitimate activities and the testing of
that theory against data on variations in indexed crimes.
Ehrlich follows the same initial reasoning as others, namely
assuming the individual to be a rational economic actor, rather than
using a criminal motivational technique. "A reliance on a motivation
unique to the offender as a major explanation of actual crime does not,
in general, render possible predictions regarding the outcome of objec-
tive circumstances." [Ref. 42]. Ehrlich hypothesizes that even if there
is no one theory that dominates in the explanation of aberrant behavior,
all individuals will respond to some form of incentives. To that end,
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his analysis examines not only costs of non-compliance but also the
rewards for non-compliance.
Ehrlich perceives violations of law as potential increases in the
violator's pecuniary wealth, his or her psychic well-being, or both. The
violator also formulates an expected value based on the probability of
detection and conviction, and the cost of conviction to the offender.
Ehrlich views the potential violator's choice to be between compliance
and non-compliance. These two activities are mutually exclusive and the
individual makes his choice by comparing the expected utility of each
one.
Ehrlich approaches the problem as a question of optimal enforce-
ment based on the different types of indexed crime. The results of his
testing showed the results to be consistent with the hypothesis, noting
that there were numerous shortcomings in the crime statistics used. Data
was often insufficient to make comparisons between different penalty
assessment policy periods and the different impacts that different as-
sessment policies had on the public. Interestingly, Ehrlich often found
that enforcement activity was far beyond the optimal point given the
societal loss of a particular crime [Ref. 43].
5. Goldberg and Nold, 1980 [Ref. 44]
In a more recent analysis, Goldberg and Nold examine one aspect
of the generalized law enforcement theory. Certainly an agency's efforts
towards detection of a violation appear to be the primary variable of the
probability of detection. The authors, however, examine the increased
use of private security companies and neignborhood cooperatives in




The analysis and results of their study provided strong support
for the hypothesis that:
"... perceived victim-specific self-protection efforts - here the
probability that the victim would report the crime - deter burglars;
households that are more likely to report crimes are less likely to
be victimized." [Ref. 45]
The authors point out that in face-to-face crime, the potential violator
must evaluate the victim's probability of reporting the crime to deter-
mine the expected value of violating the law.
6. Polinsky and Shavell, 1979 [Ref. 46]
The authors in this effort attempt to take a micro view of the
primary deterrent variables, probability of detection and conviction, and
the cost of conviction. They agree with the generalization made by
Becker that holding all other variables constant, increasing either
variable should decrease the number of violations. The authors also
point out that for any given probability of detection, there can be a
cost of conviction sufficient to deter a potential violator. Changes in
the cost of conviction to the offender (in the case of a civil penalty,
the change in the amount of penalty assessed) occur at basically no cost
to the enforcing agency. Certainly there are costs associated with
increasing the law enforcement activity of the agency. The argument
might then be to minimize the law enforcement activity and maximize the
cost of conviction, thus maintaining an expected value of non-compliance
sufficient to make it the least preferred alternative.
The authors point out that a person's financial standing is yet
another primary variable. If the cost of conviction is beyond the wealth
of the individual, raising that cost will have little deterrent impact.
36

Further, entities are not usually evaluated as risk takers. "The possi-
bility of risk aversion in an entity does not imply that they cannot be
induced to make the same decision about engaging in the activity ..."
[Ref. 47]. Risk aversion may demand, however, that the benefits of
non-compliance be much higher than the costs of compliance.
The authors analyze economic models with and without consider-
ation to the potential violator's wealth and risk aversion. They point
out that optimal enforcement (used in the same sense as Becker used in
his analysis) would differ greatly under the two circumstances. It was
hypothesized that where violators are, in fact, risk averse, the optimal
enforcement posture is one that increases the expected value of non-
compliance primari 1y through increased enforcement activity, not in-
creased cost of conviction.
Some assumptions are unique to this analysis. First it was
assumed that a law-abiding citizen would not be unjustly penalized, i.e.,
not mistakenly fined. Also it was assumed that individuals had only two
alternatives. They could either comply with the law or they could
violate the law. In reality, an individual entity often has many choices
other than these two which exist at opposite ends of the spectrum. There
are many different levels of compliance and an individual may elect any
one level in between total compliance and total non-compliance. An
assumption is also made that individual wealth does not vary greatly. Of
course it does, but in analyzing the impact of varying policies in the




7. Block, Nold and Sidak, 1981 [Ref. 49]
The final effort to be discussed centers around the formulation
and testing of a model to describe behavior with respect to one specific
type of law, namely an antitrust statute. It is not necessary to address
the details of the statute involved. The aspects of the model will be
identified, however.
The authors recognize that the risks and costs of prosecution are
the primary deterrent factors. It is interesting to note that the
statute involved has both civil and criminal sanctions but that the "...
civil sanctions provide most of the sting...." of the enforcement process
[Ref. 50].
What the authors consider in this model that others do not is
that the probability of detection and the level of compliance chosen are
not independent variables. In many circumstances, this can be a valid
consideration. Certainly the more above the speed limit a driver goes,
the more likely he or she is to be apprehended. However, this point is
contingent upon different levels of compliance open to the person.
The authors are consistent with all aspects brought out in other
models. They see the would-be violator (in this case, a group of busi-
nessmen examining price fixing options) chosing the alternative that
maximizes utility. In the case of a profit oriented organization, the
choice will be the alternative that maximizes profit.
The authors' points may have limited application to this thesis
because in the majority of cases, the entity is seeking to minimize cost,
not maximize profit. Nonetheless, it is important that they be addressed.
Probably the most interesting comment in their effort is the recognition
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given to the Tack of "... national, or even regional, industries having
identical products, costs, and demand conditions but varying levels of
antitrust enforcement" [Ref. 51]. There simply is not a controlled set
of conditions to accurately test their model. This is a critical problem
in all works on the subject.
B. APPLICATION TO THE COAST GUARD
This section will examine how previous efforts of model development
apply to the Coast Guard civil penalty assessment process. Areas not
addressed in these previous models, but which are of significance in
describing compliance with the law, will also be identified. It is not,
however, the intent of this section to develop a new economic model to
describe the compliance process for the statutes and regulations under
consideration. This is unnecessarily complex for a comparative analysis.
Also, it will be noted that differences between the MEP and RBS programs
are significant in many respects. As such, the analysis will be done
separately for each program rather than making an effort to combine the
two programs in one analysis.
1
.
The Statutes and Regulations
The MEP and RBS law enforcement programs are in fact primarily
deterrence-oriented. Though civil penalty provisions are associated with
deterrence, both the primary laws involved in these law enforcement
programs also carry criminal provisions. This thesis is not geared
toward morally blameworthy conduct and criminal proceedings. The primary
interest is in civil penalty actions. Civil penalty actions avoid the
difficult questions of how to quantify the costs of imprisonment or the
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other costs of being "convicted." Further, criminal proceedings are
beyond the control of the Coast Guard and in the author's opinion, are
not effected with consideration given to optimal conditions of enforce-
ment.
It is important to consider the main statutes of each law en-
forcement program under analysis. There is a distinct difference in what
they require of those that are affected. First, the Clean Water Act
proscribes a certain activity, namely the discharge of oil, in harmful
quantities, into or upon certain waters and adjoining shorelines. It
matters not how this activity is to be prevented, just that it is.
Second, the Federal Boating Safety Act in large part requires certain
things to be carried aboard a boat, though it also proscribes "Negligent
Operation" of a vessel.
For purposes of this analysis, the Clean Water Act will be con-
sidered a performance statute in that it requires a level of performance
sufficient to prevent a prohibited discharge of oil. The Federal Boating
Safety Act will be considered to be mainly a physical requirement type
statute in that it and the regulations developed or adopted under it
require certain things, such as personal flotation devices and fire
extinguishers, to be aboard a boat when it is in use.
2. The Entity
The term "entity" will be used to describe the person or organi-
zation subject to a statute or regulation. In the analysis of the RBS
program, civil penalty cases only involve individuals while in the
analysis of the MEP program, civil penalty cases are encountered against
both individuals and organizations.
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As did all authors of previous work, this thesis will assume that
the entity is a "rational economic actor." The entity will select that
alternative which maximizes its utility, whether it be through cost
minimization or profit maximization. In making this selection, the
entity will be assumed to have perfect information. This truly is a
critical assumption and one that was made repeatedly throughout the
previously discussed models. Perfect information includes even basic
information about the statutory or regulatory requirements, as well as
the expected cost of non-compliance.
Another important consideration pertinent to this thesis is that
the entity does not simply have just two compliance alternatives from
which to select. As Polinsky and Shavell (1979) pointed out in their
work, in reality, there are many different compliance alternatives from
which an entity may select. The RBS statutes and regulations are numer-
ous and those entities detected in violation ar& often in violation of
only one or two of many different requirements. The compliance decision
is made with a nearly continuous spectrum of alternatives ranging from
total compliance to total non-compliance.
The entity's wealth is not only an important consideration, it is
a statutori ly-mandated consideration in formulating an appropriate
penalty. Both the Clean Water Act and the Federal Boating Safety Act
require consideration to be given to the financial size of the entity in
the case. Polinsky and Shavell (1979) appropriately point out that an
entity's wealth is a prime determinant of the amount of risk that will be
taken in chosing to elect non-compliance.
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3. Coast Guard Activity
A discussion of Coast Guard enforcement activity and its re-
lationship to the probability of detection is necessary. Up to this
point, enforcement activity has had a very broad definition. As the data
analysis will be conducted on Coast Guard data taken from a Coast Guard
environment, it is useful to understand exactly what type of enforcement
activity was undertaken.
First, the Coast Guard detects many violations through airborne
and waterborne patrols, and from physical inspections. With respect to
the MEP program, these activities are mandated by the Commandant of the
Coast Guard in a Commandant Instruction [Ref. 52]. This Instruction
specifies the number of inspections or patrols for certain activities and
areas. In a similar manner, though without published guidelines, RBS
inspections are mandated.
There are also other considerations in determining the enforce-
ment activity. With respect to the MEP program, the Coast Guard receives
a significant number of reports of violation from concerned citizens.
Anyone can report a violation and a prohibited oil discharge is easily
detected by many people. Thus, as indicated by Goldberg and Nold (1980),
the probability of detection as perceived by the potential violator must
be formulated based not only on the enforcement agency's activity, but
also on the likelihood that a third party, victim or otherwise, will
report a violation. Also, the Clean Water Act requires the entity vio-
lating the Act to report the violation to the Coast Guard himself.
In the RBS program, enforcement activity is somewhat affected by
efforts of state and local agencies and of the Coast Guard Auxiliary.
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The Coast Guard Auxiliary conducts many inspections for compliance with
the numerous boating requirements. Though Auxiliarists may only report
that an owner or operator has violated Federal statutes or regulations,
not cite him or her, they greatly enhance the image of enforcement acti-
vity and educate the public in the existence of Federal requirements.
4. Other Considerations
It is appropriate to identify factors which affect the compliance
process that were not considered in previous work so that the results of
the test of the economic models may be interpreted after knowing all
factors which might have affected them. It may be impossible to account
for them in this effort but their identification is useful.
There has been a distinction drawn between physical requirement
and performance statutes and regulations. After a review of the case
files involved in this analysis, it was noted that violations of perfor-
mance statutes or regulations were usually unintentional. This is under-
standable. There is nothing to be gained by electing non-compliance with
the Clean Water Act. An entity loses in every respect, other than fore-
going the inconvenience related to effecting precautions necessary to
prevent a discharge. With respect to physical requirement statutes and
regulations, such as in the RBS program, there are direct costs avoided
when an entity elects non-compliance. These avoided costs are easily
calculable. Further, when an entity elects non-compliance, he is without
doubt, violating the law. As such, it is hypothesized that with physical
requirement statutes and regulations, violations tend to be much more
intentional
.
It is also important to realize that there are non-controllable
factors involved which contribute to violations of the Clean Water Act.
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The total set of circumstances that lead to a violation can vary greatly
in the case of the Clean Water Act while violations under the Federal
Boating Safety Act tend to occur under identical and indefensible circum-
stances. There is never a guarantee that precautions taken to avoid a
prohibited discharge of oil will be successful. Success can be a factor
of things such as weather, third party involvement, or "Acts of God."
This is one additional reason for dividing the analysis along program
1 ines.
The RBS physical requirement regulations were established after
careful thought and public rulemaking. There are very important safety
reasons for their existence. There is an implied cost of non-compliance,
at any level, because if required equipment is not on board when it is
needed, e.g., a personal flotation device required to assist a person
lost overboard, the cost of non-compliance can be very high. It may in
fact cause the needless loss of life. The large majority of boaters do
not deny the purpose of required equipment and registration. This
recognition fosters compliance in itself.
This implied cost associated with needing required equipment and
not having it is likely perceived by many boaters. It is a function of
an individual's awareness of the purpose of the regulations. This aware-
ness can be affected greatly by education efforts of the Coast Guard,
Coast Guard Auxiliary, and other organizations. Certainly the more aware
a boater is of the need and purpose of required equipment, the more
likely he or she is to comply, all other things held constant.
There can also be other costs associated with non-compliance. In
the case of discharged oil, the lost oil may have marketable value. In
many circumstances, a prohibited discharge of oil occurs because of
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another regrettable but not illegal event. One scenario frequently
encountered in real life is a boat sinking. Fifty gallons of gasoline
might be lost and the owner will receive a civil penalty, regardless of
fault. Nonetheless, the loss of the boat would likely far overshadow the
cost of non-compliance and the cost of lost oil, and make the impact of
the penalty minimal. Another cost, and in fact probably the biggest
deterrent cost of the MEP program, is that the entity responsible for a
prohibited discharge must also contain and remove the oil from the water
or adjoining shorelines. This cost of responding to the oil discharge is
often much greater than the sum of the civil penalty assessed and the
cost of lost oi 1
.
Finally, there is the consideration of monetary inflation when
examining different time periods such as in this analysis. For identical
circumstances, fifty dollar penalties assessed at times three years apart
will have a different deterrent effect on an entity. This must be taken
into account. (Note: For this reason, many statutes are amended period-
ically to update the penalty provisions to reflect monetary inflation.
This did not occur during the analysis period for any penalty provision,
however.
)
C. TEST OF THE BASIC MODEL
The analysis will examine the two primary factors involved in the
compliance decision model, namely the penalties and probability of detec-
tion. If the level of civil penalties assessed is higher in one period
than another, it is to be expected, ceteris paribus, that the number of
violations detected should be smaller. When comparing these time periods
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however, the Coast Guard enforcement activity levels must be considered.
Compliance decisions are based on both.
Previous work in model development has identified other factors which
can affect the compliance decision process. In analyzing two different
time periods and the effect that a different level of assessed civil
penalties may have had in deterring potential violators, many factors
would remain constant and have no impact. All assumptions regarding
factors other than the level of penalty assessed and enforcement activity
will be addressed.
Before continuing on with a discussion of the data and the analysis,
it is appropriate to consider a basic model of the civil penalty assess-
ment process. First, it is assumed that the entity does have perfect
information about its whole spectrum of compliance alternatives and can
formulate an expected cost of non-compliance for each alternative. The
entity also incurs direct costs for the level of compliance selected. It
will be assumed that the cost incurred by an entity for a certain com-
pliance level guarantees the entity that level of compliance. (It has
been mentioned that this may not always be the case in performance type
regulations where there is not always a guarantee of success.)
The entity experiences decreasing marginal utility from his or her
expenditures on compliance. The entity will therefore seek that level of
compliance expenditure where incremental expenditures no longer produce a
commensurate reduction in the expected cost of non-compliance.
The expected cost of non-compliance formulated by the entity is based
on the probability of detection and penalty assessment, and the actual
penalty itself. These factors can be thought of as the enforcement
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posture of an agency. The Coast Guard decides how many resources to
devote to enforcing certain statutes and regulations and what penalty to
assess against violators. Should the Coast Guard increase its enforce-
ment posture, thereby increasing the expected cost of non-compliance, the
entity will realize that incremental compliance expenditures will in fact
result in greater than or equal reductions in expected costs of non-
compliance. The entity would therefore be motivated to increase his or
her compliance level.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter addressed many theoretical and empirical efforts to
describe the compliance process. The unique factors which must be con-
sidered in this effort were also discussed. The next chapter will
present the structure of the data collected and the methods used to
assess the significance of the data. Critical to the data analysis will




This chapter will be presented in four sections. The purpose of this
chapter is to examine the potential for testing the basic legal compli-
ance process model and to then effect an analysis of available data. The
first section explains the sources of data and how the data were recorded
onto data files. The second section will describe the methods used to
analyze the data. The third section reports the results of the data and
discusses possible interpretations. The fourth and final section summar-
izes the data analysis effort.
A. DATA RECORDS
The data for this analysis were obtained from the Office of the Com-
mander, Eleventh Coast Guard District. Data about each program were
obtained from the separate program managers and also by an extensive
review of past civil penalty case files. The civil penalty case file was
the sole record that contained factors considered by the Hearing Officer
in determining the final outcome of a particular case. It is realistic
to assume, however, that factors other than those addressed in the case
file were also considered. Often, the case files did not contain enough
information for the Hearing Officer to consider those factors mand ated by
law, let alone other appropriate considerations. Nonetheless, for the
purposes of determining penalty assessment policy, there is no other in-
formation source that is as comprehensive as the case file.
The data extracted from the civil penalty case files were recorded on
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) data files. Subfiles
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were created within each program to separate the three regimes of Hearing
Officer data. Those subfiles are labelled as follows:
PREWNDT - data from cases processed prior to the author's regime as
Hearing Officer
WENDT - data from cases processed during the author's regime as
Hearing Officer
PSTWNDT - data from cases processed after the author's regime as
Hearing Officer.
1 . The Case Files
A short discussion of case files from each program will be made
followed by the information retrieved from the case files.
a. RBS Case Files
The RBS case files basically go back to June, 1978 because
cases are eligible for disposal once older than three years and the files
are purged monthly. The data was collected in June of 1981. Some cases
that went back to April of 1978 were encountered, however. They remained
in the files because of oversight but were still valid for this data
collection effort. A sample of 288 cases was taken. The case files were
filed serially by state driver's license number, not by any date. It was
difficult then to take a sample which reflected the Hearing Officer
regimes. It was decided to take as large a sample as possible. The
number of cases examined in this effort was limited only by the amount of
time available to the author on his data collection trip.
All case files were considered except those involving boat
manufacturers who allegedly violated construction standards, and cases
involving Negligent Operations other than boats that ran out of fuel and
required assistance. Negligent Operations is a very subjective deter-
mination and there are many and varied factors which might consititue
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Negligent Operations from time to time. The most common finding of
Negligent Operations involved the boat operator failing to provide suf-
ficient fuel for his voyage and thus requiring Coast Guard assistance.
This scenario is common and the circumstances are similar enough that
this violation was included in the analysis.
For each violation case, the value of the following variables
was recorded. A parenthetical entry with a variable indicates the values
the variable could take.
CASEID - the serial number assigned to the case by the Coast Guard.
VIOLDT - the date the violations were detected.
NOTDT - the date an initial notification letter was mailed to the
alleged violator. This data allows cases to be separated by
Hearing Officer as there was only one Hearing Officer at any
one time.
PRIORS - whether or not the alleged violator had a record of other
violations. It was felt that this would likely increase the
penalty for any case. (0,1)
ENFSRC - the type of unit that submitted the Report of Violation,
either a RBS unit, a Search and Rescue unit, or another law
enforcement unit. (0,1,2)
WATERS - the type of waters where the violation was detected, either
coastal or inland, the latter being typically the Colorado
River. (0,1)
NUMREG - the number of numbering or certificate violations. (0 and up)
NAVEQP - the number of navigation equipment violations. (0 and up)
SAFEQP - the number of safety equipment violations. (0 and up)
N000F - if there was a Negligent Operations citation for running out
of fuel. (0,1)
TOT - the total number of violations. This was of interest be-
cause it is likely that Hearing Officers recognize that
compound violations create compound hazards and a higher
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penalty should be assessed. That is, for two violations,
the penalty should be higher than the sum of the penalties
for the individual violations occurring in isolation from
each other, ceteris parabus. (1 and up)
HRNG - whether or not the alleged violator requested a Hearing.
(0,1)
WRTRSP - whether or not the alleged violator submitted a written re-
sponse to the allegations. (0,1)
PROPEN - the proposed penalty contained in the initial notification
letter to the alleged violator. (0 and up)
FINPEN - the final penalty, if any, that was assessed in the final
action in the case. (0 and up)
COMPEV - whether or not the alleged violator submitted evidence that
he had quickly gained compliance with the requirements after
notified that he was in violation. (0,1)
DISMIS - whether or not the case was dismissed. (0,1)
REMAND - whether or not the case was remanded to the program manager
for any of numerous reasons. (0,1)
The case files contained no other useful information. RBS case files are
typically very brief largely because a boat operator either is or is not
in compliance and there are few mitigating circumstances.
b. MEP Case Files
The MEP case files go back to January, 1978. Though eligible
for disposal after three years, as are the RBS cases, the MEP files are
purged yearly, not monthly. A sample of 244 cases was taken. The object
was the same as with the RBS data collection effort, namely, to collect
as much data as possible. The MEP cases files are filed, however, by
date. Thus, an effort was made to review similar numbers of cases for
each Hearing Officer.
MEP case files are typically more complex than RBS case
files. The determination of gravity consists of many factors, both
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objective and subjective. All objective measures were extracted from the
case files.
In simplifying the analysis, only cases involving Coast Guard
investigated reports were considered. The EPA cases were rejected.
Further, cases where allegations or findings of "Act of God" causation
were made were also rejected. The aim was to find cases where infor-
mation contained therein could easily be evaluated and recorded.
For each case file examined, the following information was
recorded. Again, parenthetical entries indicate the values a variable
could be assigned.
CASEID - the serial number assigned to the case file by the Coast
Guard.
SRCTYP - the type of source that the discharged oil emanated from.
This category included vessels, waterfront facilities, oil
development efforts, both onshore and offshore, and oil
transportation facilities. It was felt that these five
sources might represent different communities of entities
and that analysis for each may be more enlightening. (0,1,2,
3,4)
VIOLDT - the date of the violation.
NOTDT - the date the notice of violation was sent to the alleged
violator.
ENFSRC - the unit that submitted the report of violation, either Port
Safety Detachment Santa Barbara, Marine Safety Office Los
Angeles/Long Beach, or Marine Safety Office San Diego. (1,
2,3)
WATERS - the type of water, inland or coastal, where the violation
occurred. (0,1)
ENTSZE - the financial size of the entity. Although there is rarely
enough information in case files to assess the financial
size of the violator, this consideration was important to
the analysis. Rather than rejecting it totally, individuals
were coded in one group, large ship owners and large oil
companies in another group, and all others in a third. This
reflects an attempt to at least group the small and the big




QNTDIS - the actual quantity of oil discharged in the violation.
This is a prime factor in determining gravity of the vio-
lation. (1 and up)
PRIORS - if the alleged violator had a record of other violations.
(0,1)
HRNG - whether or not the alleged violator requested a Hearing.
(0,1)
WRTRSP - whether or not the alleged violator submitted written evi-
dence for consideration. (0,1)
PROPEN - the penalty proposed in the initial notification letter.
(1 and up)
FINPEN - the penalty, if any, assessed in the final action in the
case. (0 and up)
PPRCTR - whether or not a violation of the Pollution Prevention Re-
gulations (PPR) was contributory to the prohibited discharge.
The PPRs are regulations promulgated under the Clean Water
Act. The Coast Guard feels that a violation of these regu-
lations, in addition to subjecting an entity to separate
penalty action, also adds to the gravity of the violation
and should be considered in a finding of gravity in a case.
(0,1)
DISMIS - whether or not the case was dismissed. (0,1)
REMAND - whether or not the case was remanded to the program manager.
(0,1)
2. Violation Activity Measurement
The prime measure in evaluating the impact of a penalty assess-
ment policy is the number of violations that occurred as a result of the
policy. There are two important decisions in arriving at this measure.
First, what is the appropriate time period in which to evaluate the
impact of a penalty assessment policy? Second, how is the number of
violations to be measured?
The time period factor must be chosen so that it adequately
reflects the policy of a Hearing Officer. A penalty assessment policy,
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especially one that is significantly different from the previous policy,
does not affect entities immediately. There is some time lag because
information about the policy must be disseminated and comprehended. This
is not done formally. It is done mainly by violators relating the final
action in their case to other potential violators.
The table below shows both the effective dates of the Hearing
Officers and the periods selected to assess the impact of their penalty
assessment policies. Allowance has been made for the penalty assessment
policy to be recognized by potential violators.
Hearing Officer Regime Impact Period
PREWNDT, 1 JUL 77 to 31 JAN 79 1 JAN 78 to 31 DEC 78
WENDT, 1 FEB 79 to 1 JUN 80 1 JUL 79 to 30 SEP 80
PSTWNDT, 1 JUL 80 to 1 JUL 81 1 JAN 81 to 30 SEP 81
The only problem with the Impact Periods is that identical 12-month
periods could not be selected for comparison to prevent seasonal fluctu-
ations from contaminating other effects. An assumption is made that the
data analysis methods selected will not be hampered by this problem be-
cause comparisons will be based on proportions and ratios, not absolute
violation activity.
The second factor is more difficult to cope with. First, there
is no way to assess the total number of RBS violations that existed in
the Impact Periods. The measures used do in large part relate the total
violation activity, however. The first measure is the proportion of in-
spections where violations were detected. The second measure is mean
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number of violations per inspection where violations were detected. The
third measure is the ratio of total violations to total inspections.
These measures reflect proportions or per unit numbers so that compari-
sons between periods with different activity can be made. If these
measures are significantly different beween Impact Periods, it may be an
indication that different policies have had different impacts.
With respect to the MEP analysis, it is again difficult to assess
the significance of the number of prohibited discharges of oil without
some reference to the total potential discharges. There is no way to
know how many "potential" discharges there were in the impact period.
The measures used, however, do make some attempt to establish a base
level of activity. A review of the MEP case files indicate that the
cause of prohibited discharges is related more often than not to oil
transfers of some sort. Relating violation activity to the amount of oil
transferred in a period should give an indication of the impact of a
penalty assessment policy. The two measures used are the proportion of
oil discharges to the total amount of oil transferred, and the ratio of
violation cases generated to the total amount of oil transferred.
3. Enforcement Activity
The activity levels will be discussed separately for each program
area since they are determined in very separate ways. Enforcement ac-
tivity is an essential consideration in evaluating penalty assessment
policies. The entity not only examines penalties assessed for detected
violations, but also the probability of detection. The probability of
detection relates in large part to the activity of the enforcing agency




The basic activity level in the RBS program is number of
vessels inspected. Nonetheless, as an entity formulates a probability of
detection, the RBS activity must be considered in light of the number of
times boats are in use. It is a simple matter to derive the number of
inspections the Coast Guard made for compliance with RBS statutes and
regulations in the study area. It is impossible to determine the total
number of times individual boats were put in use. The measure that might
have been the most appropriate would be the ratio of RBS inspections to
the total number of boats registered in the states of the study area.
Although the number of registered boats is not a figure wholly indicative
of the number of times boats are used, it is the best measure available.
Unfortunately, it was not available in a form that would allow a period
by period impact comparison. It was available by a calendar year summary.
Therefore, some attempt will be made to account for trends in this ratio.
b. MEP Activity
The MEP activity level is even harder to assess. There is no
inspection made on a vessel or any other entity for pollution. There are
patrols for pollution and there are reports received indicating someone,
usually the caller, has discharged oil in violation of the Clean Water
Act. Another confounding factor is that it may be easy to prove a vio-
lation occurred but very difficult to prove who did it.
It will be assumed that the activity level of the MEP program
relates directly to the proportion of reported or detected discharges
where an entity is found to be the responsible party. While there cer-
tainly are many other reasons, such as conscience or public image, which
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lead to the discovery of a responsible party, the entity will be assumed
to formulate a probability of detection and penalty assessment based on
the Coast Guard's success in finding the discharger. This ignores the
oil discharges that occur but are never reported or discovered, and
admittedly there may be a significant number. Further, a discharge of
oil in a boat marina and one ten miles out to sea have vastly different
probabilities of detection. Nonetheless, these factors are all but
impossible to account for and the assumption holds.
B. DATA ANALYSIS METHODS
This section will be divided into three subsections. The first out-
lines the methods used to determine and compare the different penalty
assessment policies, while the second and third address the violation
levels and enforcement activity respectively.
1 . Penalty Assessment Policy
Regression analysis will be used to determine the penalty assess-
ment policy of each Hearing Officer regime. The SPSS regression program
will be used for this task. A TI-59 programmable calculator will also be
used for computations not within the scope of the SPSS programs.
There are numerous variables that could be regressed against the
dependent variable. Only those with some causative and significant re-
lationship to the dependent variable will be selected. These will be
identified in Appendix C along with the total set of results from the
regression analyses. There will be two sets of regressions done for each
program. One will use PROPEN, the proposed penalty in the case, and the
other will use FINPEN, the final agency action in the case.
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A CHOW test will be the primary analytical tool used in two of
the three tasks of this first data analysis effort. A CHOW test is a
statistical technique that determines the significance of the difference
of two or more regression equations. It does this through the computa-
tion of an F-statistic as indicated in Figure 1.
The term RRSS and URSS deserve further explanation. Suppose that
the variable WATERS is considered for inclusion into the regression
analysis for the RBS data file. How can it be determined a priori that
it is a significant variable? First the data file is divided into those
cases where WATERS=0 and those where WATERS=1 . Regression analysis is
effected on each subset using independent variables that are certain to
have a causal and significant effect. The regression analysis will
produce the residual sums of squares for each subset. The sum of these
two figures equals the URSS which is used in the CHOW test equation. A
third regression analysis is run using the whole RBS data file without




Where RRSS = the restricted residual sums of squares
URSS = the unrestricted residual sums of squares
k = the number of regressors in the analysis
nl = the number of observations in data set 1
n2 = the number of observations in data set 2, and
F = the statistic with distribution
((k+l),(nl+n2-2k-2))
Figure 1 . CHOW Test
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regression analysis equals the RRRS in the equation. If significantly
different regression equations are generated by the regression analysis
on the data subsets, the variable will be included for further analysis.
Significance is determined by examining the probability value associated
with the F-statistic generated by the CHOW test. The same test will be
used to assess the difference in regression analysis effected for the
data subfiles which represent different Hearing Officer policies. [Ref.
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In the first task, all three data subfiles (PREWNDT, WENDT, and
PSTWNDT) were run together. The goal was to determine whether or not
certain dummy variables which might have a causal relation to the de-
pendent variables, should be created in the subfile regression task.
Those variables nominated for possible conversion to dummy variables were
as follows:
RBS Program-WATERS (0,1) and ENFSRC (0,1,2)
MEP Program-WATERS (0,1), ENFSRC (1,2,3), ENTSZE (1,2,3)
In the first task, if the F-statistic revealed a difference significant
at the alpha = .01 level, a dummy variable would be created and included
as an independent variable for the subfile regression analysis. In the
second task, after separate subfile regressions were effected including
certain dummy variables, comparisons could be made, again using the CHOW
test, to see where significant differences between regressions existed.
If there were such differences, it would be appropriate to conclude that
there was a significant difference in penalty assessment policies.
One other test would be required. The CHOW test shows where
significant differences exist, but not necessarily in which direction the
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difference is. To determine whether or not different assessment policies
were higher or lower than each other, a T-test was needed. The T-test
would examine the mean penalty and standard deviation assessed by a
Hearing Officer and compare it to the mean predicted penalty and standard
deviation based on the regression equation developed for another Hearing
Officer and using the case file data of the first Hearing Officer. This
would reveal both the significance of any difference and which Hearing
Officer assessed larger penalties.
To account for inflation, some factor would be needed to equate
penalties and predicted penalties in this comparison. A factor of 15%
per year was used. It is felt that this factor, which is an overcompen-
sation, would make the comparisons very conservative as would the alpha
level of .01
.
2. Violation Activity Measurement
There is no way to statistically test the significance between
violation levels as evaluated by the measures selected. These measures
will be presented in tabular form and qualitative judgements made about
the differences.
3. Enforcement Activity
As discussed in the earlier section IV. A. 3, there is no perfect
way to measure enforcement activity. The measures selected will be pre-
sented but again, there is no way to measure the statistical significance
of these differences. As such, qualitative judgements will be made. One
table and one graph will be presented and conclusions made from them.
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C. DATA ANLAYSIS RESULTS
The results of the analysis will be presented by program. The re-
sults of the numerous regressions to determine which nominated variables
should be converted to dummy variables will not be presented. Their in-
clusion in the final regressions is evidence that they were considered
significant for the final subfile analyses.
1. RBS Data Analysis Results
Appendix C lists the six different regressions run for the RBS
data file. One is for each subfile, once using PROPEN as the dependent
variable, and once using FINPEN as the dependent variable. All six
regressions resulted in significant regression equations at the .01
level. The R squared numbers achieved in the analyses were generally
very acceptable given there are qualitative judgements made by Hearing
Officers that can neither be quantified nor extracted from the case
files. When comparing the regression equations with each other, as
depicted in Appendix D, several conclusions could be drawn.
Using the CHOW test, the assessment policies of both WENDT and
PSTWNDT proved to be significantly different from the PREWNDT policy, in
both the FINPEN and PROPEN runs. Comparisons of WENDT and PSTWNDT as-
sessment policies revealed no significant differences. Using the T-test,
however, the results were not quite so clear cut. In general, in both
the FINPEN and PROPEN runs, PREWNDT and WENDT assessment policies were
significantly different from each other, both with and without inclusion
of the inflation factor. In this comparison, penalties assessed under
the WENDT assessment policy were higher. Significant differences were
also detected between PSTWNDT and PRWNDT, with the PSTWNDT assessment
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policy assessing higher penalties. These differences were not evident
when accounting for the inflation factor, however.
It may be concluded that the differences in the penalty assess-
ment policies between the Hearing Officers, especially the difference
between WENDT and PREWNDT, are sufficiently significant to suspect dif-
ferent violation activity. Thus, the violation activity that existed
during the impact periods will be examined to see if the entities
followed the basic economic model. The results of the violation analysis
follow in Table 1, with data extracted from Appendix E. "Im. Pr. " stands
for the assessment policy impact period. "Iv/I" denotes the ratio of
inspections that resulted in violations detected to the total inspections.
"TV/Iv" denotes the mean number of violations detected per inspection
where some violation was detected. "TV/I' denotes the ratio of viola-
tions detected to all inspections.
Table 1. RBS Violation Activity
Im. Pr. Iv/I TV/Iv TV/I
PREWNDT .4577 1.7860 .8166
WENDT .5573 1.7162 .9565
PSTWNDT .5469 1.9030 1 . 0408
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This table shows what appears to be a marked increase in the two
measures Iv/I and TV/I from PREWNDT to WENDT, with a leveling off during
PSTWNDT. The third measure, TV/Iv, shows a decrease between PREWNDT and
WENDT but an increase during PSTWNDT. Though there is no way to make a
statistical conclusion about these measures, they appear to be moving
opposite to the direction anticipated. Since the WENDT assessment policy
is definitely higher than PREWNDT, a decrease in violation activity would
have been anticipated. Similarly, the difference between the assessment
policies of PREWNDT and PSTWNDT would suggest a decrease though perhaps
not as strong. In either case, the data does not support the changes
forecast by the basic model.
It is then appropriate to examine the enforcement activity in the
RBS program. Data again is extracted from Appendix E and is summarized
in Table 2. The data were not configured to give a period by period im-
pact comparison, but are arranged by calendar year. The term "I/TBR" is
the ratio of total RBS inspections made for that year to the total boat
registrations in the states that surround and lay over the study area.







Again, it is difficult to assess the significance of this steady
decreasing trend. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to argue that by
this measure, a boater in 1978 had a fifty-six percent better chance of
being boarded than he would in 1980. This may have accounted for the
actual rise in violation activity even in light of a higher level of
assessed penalties. If the entity viewed the decreased probability of
detection as far more significant than the higher penalties, a lower ex-
pected cost of non-compliance may have been perceived.
2. MEP Data Analysis Results
The results of the six basic regression analysis are contained in
Appendix C. All regressions resulted in an F-statistic significant at
the .01 level. The R-squared's achieved were not as high as in the RBS
analysis. This is to be expected because many more factors involved in
the penalty decision are qualitative. The comparisons made between the
regression equations are addressed in Appendix D.
The FINPEN analysis proved to be more conclusive than the PROPEN
analysis in the CHOW test comparisons, with all three subfiles yielding
significantly different regression equations. In the PROPEN analyses,
only WENDT and PSTWNDT proved to be significantly different. In the
T-test comparisons, the FINPEN analyses again proved to be more conclu-
sive. Penalty assessment policies of WENDT and PREWNDT were signifi-
cantly different with and without the inflation factor, the WENDT
assessment policy being higher. WENDT and PSTWNDT also proved to be
significantly different assessment policies with WENDT again being the
higher assessment policy, both with and without the inflation factor.
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In the PROPEN analysis, WENDT and PREWNDT proved to be signifi-
cantly different both with and without the inflaction factor, WENDT being
the higher assessment policy. Also, WENDT and PSTWNDT were significantly
different with and without the inflation factor, with WENDT again being
the higher assessment policy. The sum of these comparisons would lead to
the conclusion that both before and after WENDT, the assessment policies
created smaller penalties. This might better isolate the impact of the
WENDT policy if other factors do not confound it. This impact, according
to the basic model, should be decreased violation activity in the WENDT
impact period as compared to either the PREWNDT or PSTWNDT impact periods.
The violation activity presented in each of the impact periods is
presented below in Table 3. The data were taken from Appendix F. "Im.
Pr. " denotes the impact period for each Hearing Officer regime. "DR/QOT"
denotes the ratio of the number of prohibited oil discharge reports and
detections to the quantity of oil (bbls. x 1,000,000) transferred.
"Q0D/Q0T" denotes the ratio of the quantity of oil discharged (bbls.) to
the quantity of oil (bbls. x 1,000,000) transferred.
Table 3. MEP Violation Activity
Im. Pr. DR/QOT Q0D/Q0T
PREWNDT 2.5528 23.5948




These figures tend to support the conclusion that less oil was
discharged during WENDT than PREWNDT, when using the QOD/QOT measure.
Also, when examining the DR/QOT measure, there appears to be a marked
decrease from PREWNDT to WENDT. Both measures changed as predicted by
the basic model. In comparing WENDT and PSTWNDT, it can be seen that
while the QOD/QOT measure decreased slightly, the DR/QOT measure in-
creased significantly, nearly returning to the PREWNDT level. The later
measure changed as predicted by the basic model.
Figure 2 represents a graph of MEP Enforcement Activity with time
on the X-axis and "VRS/DR" , the proportion of all reports or detections
of discharged oil that result in a violation report being submitted, on
the Y-axis. This graph reveals a steady trend of an increasing VRS/DR.
This would likely mean a steadily increasing probability of detection and
penalty assessment as perceived by entity. The asterisks are the actual
data points as plotted. The line drawn on the graph is a plot of the
equation which resulted from a simple linear regression analysis run on
the data. It would appear that this trend is steady enough that the
marked changes detected in the violation activity measures are due to
assessment policy, not enforcement activity.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the data sources used in the analysis and the
manner in which the data were transposed to computer files. The methods
used in the data analysis were identified as were all necessary assump-
tions. Finally, the actual data results were presented. The output of
all the separate analyses are contained in the appendices and it was not
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necessary to repeat them in this chapter. Only pertinent extractions





















The missions of the Coast Guard's main law enforcement programs have
been identified. The statutes and regulations pertinent to these mis-
sions have been addressed. A comprehensive review of literature which
dealt with economic models to describe law compliance processes was
presented. It was predicted, based on these models, that if the level of
penalties assessed was elevated, entities would be encouraged to expend
more resources on compliance and therefore, fewer violations would be
committed. Any analysis must, however, take into account the enforcement
activity of the Coast Guard when interpreting the results. The prob-
ability of detecting violations is a function of enforcement activity.
For an entity to formulate an expected cost of non-compliance, he or she
must know both the cost of being detected and the probability of being
detected.
The study area selected was the Eleventh Coast Guard District,
largely because of data availability and access. Also, the author was
the former Hearing Officer of the Eleventh Coast Guard District and based
on his personal judgement, there were very different penalty assessment
policies in existence before, and possibly after, his tour there. Fur-
ther, there would likely exist difinitive measures that would allow a
comparison of the impacts of these different policies. As stated, there
rarely exists a very controlled set of circumstances that allows for a
definitive test of the economic models, but it was believed that the last
three years of data from the Eleventh Coast Guard District would provide
just such a set of circumstances.
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The test of the basic model was effected separately for the two
programs analyzed. The entities involved in each program are different
as are the statutes and regulations. The data available were sufficient
to allow for the separate analyses and the results were likely to be more
meaningful because the enforcement activity in each program was scheduled
independently. Thus, the effect of the assessment policy and enforcement
activity for each program would not be obscured by the policy and
activity of the other.
The penalty assessment policies were determined through regression
analysis. Variables, based on information extracted from actual case
files, were regressed against the penalties in the case file. Both the
proposed and final penalties were used as the dependent variable. Com-
parisons of the policies were effected through the use of the CHOW test
and the T-test. The impacts of the policies were measured in periods
which allowed time for entities to become cognizant of the policy, espe-
cially where it had changed significantly. Impacts were assessed using
the best violation measures available. The enforcement activity, the
other prime input to violation activity measurement, was also assessed.
The measures here were also imperfect, but represent the best available.
The analyses revealed, as had been suspected, that there were signi-
ficant differences in the penalty assessment policies of three different
regimes of Hearing Officers. These differences existed at an alpha = .01
level and using an inflation factor of 15 percent. Thus, the results
should be conservative and conclusive.
In the Recreational Boating Safety (RBS) law enforcement program, the
assessment policy of the author (WENDT) proved to create significantly
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higher penalties than the policy of his predecessors (PREWNDT). The
enforcement activity measures also show, however, that going from PREWNDT
to PSTWNDT (the successor to the author), enforcement activity declined
significantly. Thus, it is difficult to analyze the differences in vio-
lation activity. It is proposed, however, that the definite increase in
violation activity is the result of decreased enforcement activity.
Thus, the expected cost of non-compliance was lowered by a decreaseing
probability of detection, in spite of higher levels of assessed penalties
in the later periods, and higher violation activity resulted.
In the Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) law enforcement program,
the WENDT assessment policy proved to create significantly higher penal-
ties than both the PREWNDT and PSTWNDT assessment policies. Unlike the
RBS program, the enforcement activity measure showed a steadily in-
creasing trend over the impact periods. In examining the violation
activity, there appears to be significantly lower levels during the WENDT
impact period, when the level of penalties assessed was highest. This
agrees with the basic model and it is proposed that there was, in fact, a
cause and effect relationship between assessment policy and violation
activity. The enforcement activity, although different for each impact
period, was not different to a degree that should have obscured the
impact of the different policies. Even when considering enforcement
activity, the violation activity did appear to react significantly, in
all comparisons, to the different assessment policies.
The results of this analysis are useful. They show that the expected
cost of non-compliance is affected by both the level of assessed penal-
ties and the Coast Guard's enforcement activity. Where there is no
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radical change in enforcement activity, incremental changes in assessment
policy should bring about changes predicted by the basic model. Where
there is a radical change to the enforcement activity, increases in the
level of assessed penalties can not be counted on to maintain a constant
level of expected cost of non-compliance. Enforcement activity, which is
the prime determinant of probability of detection, appears to be a more
important factor in the level of compliance an entity elects.
The Coast Guard maintains nearly all of the data used in this analysis.
It is possible for the data to be collected and used as it was in this
analysis on a routine basis. Resources could be directed to or away from
certain units, or changes in assessment policies could be proposed, that
would more effectively carry out the basic mission Coast Guard law en-
forcement programs, namely deterrence. A secondary function of such
analyses would be to maintain a uniform enforcement posture within a
Coast Guard district, or throughout the entire Coast Guard. This could
not be done without some cost, however. The determination of the cost
effectiveness of such a program would be a policy decision appropriate
for the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Nonetheless, it could be the
first step in providing some useful guidance to District Commanders and


















































The subfile regression results for each of the programs and dependent
variables is presented below. The column head "Ind. Var." indicates the
variables which were eventually included in the subfile analyses. Some
of these variables do not appear in section IV.A.l.a & b. These vari-
ables are dummy variables created to include significant factors in the
analysis. They will be identified where they appear. The column head
"coef." indicates the variable's coefficient. The column head "Cum. R
squared" indicates the cumulative R squared for that variable and all
others above it in the table. The regression constant is also given at
the bottom of the table. Finally, the F-statistic, degrees of freedom
(DF), and probability value (PV) is listed for the regression analysis.
RBS-FINPEN Regressions
Subfile: PREWNDT









f-stat: 7.22791 DF: (7
:
,93) PV: .0000007
NOTE: The variable El is a dummy variable used to account for the signi-
ficant difference of the dependent variable when ENFSRC=1 , that is





























F-stat: 27.27511 DF: (7 ,132) PV: .0000000
Subfile: PSTWNDT









































































F-stat: 47.49760 DF: (6
:
,133) i PV: .0000000
Subfile: PSTWNDT










































Note: The variable Wl takes on the value 1 when WATERS=1 (Coastal), E2
takes on the value 1 when ENFSRC=2 (MSO Los Angeles/Long Beach),
E3 takes on the value 1 when ENFSRC=3 (MSO San Diego), and ES
































Constant = 180. 24





Ind. Var. Coef. Cum. R squared
PRIORS 412.24 .09241
QNTDIS .244 .22137





Constant = 653. 12












Constant = -226 .80


































This appendix will be presented in two parts. First, the results of
regression equation comparisons will be made. These comparisons were
effected using the CHOW test. The CHOW test evaluates the difference
between regression equations formulated for each Hearing Officer. These
regression equations, which regress independent case file variables
against the penalties of the case file, represent the penalty assessment
policy of that Hearing Officer.
The second part will analyze the policies of different Hearing
Officers by comparing the penalties assessed by a Hearing Officer with
the penalties that would have been assessed by a different Hearing
Officer based on the factors of the cases of the first Hearing Officer.
This is done by using a regression equation formulated for each Hearing
Officer and running it on the case file data for another Hearing Officer.
A. CHOW TEST COMPARISONS
The following table summarizes the individual regression comparisons
effected using the CHOW test. Three data subfiles were created that
represent the three different Hearing Officer regimes. They are PREWNDT,
WENDT, and PSTWNDT. They will be noted only as PRE, WNT, AND PST in the
table under the column "Com. File", which indicates the files being
compared. The terms "nl" and "n2" represent the number of cases in each
file and "k" the number of regressors in the regression equations. The
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term "SSRp" represents the residual sum of squares when the two compari-
son files are combined into one for a regression analysis. The terms
"SSR1" and "SSR2" represent the residual sum of squares when the compari-
son files undergo regression analysis separately. "F" represents the
F-statistic calculated by the CHOW test and "PV" represents the proba-
bility value of the F-statistic. The probability value indicates the
probability of the difference between the two regression equations being
only chance. Two separate tables are presented for both RBS and MEP
data. This is because separate regressions were effected using FINPEN,
the final assessed penalty, and PROPEN, the proposed penalty, as the
dependent variable.
RBS-PROPEN Comparisons







SSRp SSR1 SSR2 PV
139,,706 53,,579 53,,329 9,,949 .0000
72,,127 53,,579 17 ,879 ,231 .9773
92,,745 17 ,879 53 ,329 5.,790 .0000
RBS-FINPEN Comparisons






























































Com. Files n]_ n2 k S5Rp SSR1 SSR2 F PV
WNT & PRE 88 95 7 85,657 50,194 22,700 3.655 .0006
WNT & PST 88 66 7 118,202 50,194 24,057 10.211 .0000
PRE & PST 95 66 7 53,578 22,700 24,507 2.6411 .0098
B. T-TEST COMPARISONS
As noted, these comparisons determine if the policy of one Hearing
Officer would have resulted in different penalties given the cases of
another Hearing Officer. The first step in this process is to use the
regression equation developed for a Hearing Officer to compute predicted
penalties based on data of a second Hearing Officer's case files. Then,
a mean and standard deviation for the predicted penalties is computed.
These are then compared, using a T-test, to the actual mean penalty and
standard deviation of the second Hearing Officer's case files.
The first column of the following tables is labelled "SR." This
indicates the source of the regression equation used for the comparison.
A regression equation may be from one of the three data subfiles, either
PREWNDT (PRE), WENDT (WNT), or PSTWNDT (PST). The first step in the
comparison is to compute predicted penalties using the SR equation on the
case file data of the reference file, labelled "RF." A mean penalty,
"XI," and standard deviation, "SI," using the SR equation is then com-
pared, using a T-test, to the actual mean penalty, "X2," and standard
deviation, "S2," assessed in the reference file. A test statistic, "TS,"
and probability value, "PV" associated with each comparison is then
indicated. Finally, XI is adjusted to the time frame of the reference
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file, using a 15% inflation factor, and is labelled "XT." XI 1 is then
compared to X2 using the T-test and a second test statistic, "TS 1 ," and
probability value, "PV," are computed. The basic hypothesis is that the
population mean difference is not statistically significant. Where the
PV or PV is less than the alpha level of .01, a conclusion may be drawn
about the difference in the two populations. A summary of the conclu-
sions follows each table. As before, the comparisons were run for each
program, once using PROPEN and once using FINPEN.
RBS-FINPEN Comparisons
SR RF XI X2 SI S2 TS PV XV TS' PV
PRE WNT 28.03 45.34 12.84 34.97 -5.50 .000 32.23 -4.15 .000
PRE PST 31.62 42.96 19.04 36.62 -1.88 .031 41.82 -0.19 .425
WNT PRE 43.06 27.07 30.79 33.20
WNT PST 41.74 42.96 29.02 36.62
PST PRE 38.26 27.07 27.24 33.20
PST WNT 45.01 45.34 23.29 34.97
Conclusions
SR RF Hypotheses Accepted
PRE WNT X2 > XI , X2 > XI
'
WNT PRE XI > X2, XV> X2
PST PRE XI > X2
3.55 .000 37.44 2.30 .010
0. 18 .429 48.00 0.74 .231
2.62 .005 28.93 0.44 .332




SR RF XI X2 SI S2 TS PV XT TS' PV
PRE ENT 38.25 53.08 18.82 34.81 -4.43 .000 43.99 -2.72 .003
PRE PST 41.09 56.57 23.09 34.38 -2.56 .006 54.34 -0.37 .356
WNT PRE 54.54 42.33 30.46 35.52 2.63 .005 47.43 1. 10 .137
WNT PST 52.65 56.57 28.85 34.38 -0.60 .275 60.55 0.61 .272
























0.82 .207 48.84 -1.12 .131
MEP-FINPEN Comparisons
SR RF XI X2 SI S2 TS PV XV TS' PV
PRE WNT 535 946 531 1116 -3. 12 .001 616 -2.51 .007
PRE PST 602 536 1877 716 0.27 .395 796 1.05 .147
WNT PRE 880 454 731 609 4.36 .000 765 3.19 .001
WNT PST 881 536 3198 716 0.85 .197 1013 1.18 .120





946 271 1116 -3.89 .000 409 -4.39 .000
SR RF Hypo -thesis Aci:epted
PRE WNT X2 > XI
,
X2 > XV
WNT PRE XI > X2
,
XV > X2






SR RF XI X2 SI S2 TS PV
•
XI
1 TS 1 PV
PRE ENT 690 1120 619 1336 -2.74 .003 793 -2.08 .009
PRE PST 763 582 1818 773 0.74 .228 1009 1.76 .041
WNT PRE 1038 675 826 1013 2.70 .004 902 1.69 .047
WNT PST 1075 582 3505 773 1.12 .113 1236 1.48 .071





















X2 > XI 1
X2 > XI, X2 > XI
'




RECREATIONAL BOATING SAFETY DATA
A. NUMBER OF BOATS REGISTERED BY STATE
The following information about boat registrations was provided by
the person and agency noted for each state. All data were obtained by
































Source: Mil 1 y Tenney, Department of Parks and Recreation
B. BOAT INSPECTIONS AND VIOLATION DETECTION
The following data are presented by calendar year quarter except for
a three quarter period extending from the first quarter of 1980 up to and
including the third quarter of 1980. During this period, data were
available only as summarized for the entire three quarters. The column
headed "Total Insp." is the number of inspections made during the period
for violations of RBS statutes and regulations. "Viol. Insp." indicates
the number of inspections where violations were detected. "Total Viol."
indicates the total number of individual violations detected.
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Year/Quarter Total Insp. Viol. Insp. Total Viol.
1978/1 337 146 239
2 1010 438 880
3 1695 816 1426
4 409 169 273
1979/1 382 208 343
2 1181 675 1199
3 1407 833 1485
4 444 253 441
1980/1
Through 1829 965 1594
1980/3
1980/4 446 206 311
1981/1 336 159 351
2 721 410 762
3 903 503 921





MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DATA
The following data were taken from the PSS/MEP Quarterly Activities
Reports of the Eleventh Coast Guard District. Data are listed for indi-
vidual law enforcement units as well as an aggregate figure for the
entire District. "SB" stands for the Port Safety Detachment, Santa
Barbara, California. "LA" stands for the Marine Safety Office, Los
Angeles/Long Beach, California. "SD" stands for the Marine Safety Office,
San Diego, California. The column head "Disch." lists the number of
prohibited oil discharges reported to or detected by the Coast Guard that
quarter, that occurred in the Eleventh Coast Guard District. The head
"Viol. Rpt. " represents the number of actual violation reports submitted
and processed for these discharges. "Oil Trans." represents the amount
of oil (in barrels x 1,000) that was transferred. "Oil Spl." represents
the amount of oil (in barrels) discharged into U.S. waters in violation




Unit Disch. Viol. Rpt. Oil Trans. Oil Spl.
SD 56 10 3,409 26
LA 214 27 88,629 2735
SB 48 3 4,216 714
Tot. 318 40 96,254 3475
SD 47 7 9,800 482
LA 194 34 109,591 4572
SB 34 1 6,378 70
Tot. 275 42 125,769 5174
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Year/Qrt. Unit Disch. Viol. Rpt. Oil Trans. Oil Spl.
1978/3 SD 50 13 4,250 40
LA 192 28 91 ,960 147
SB 9 4,517 121
Tot. 251 41 100,727 308
1978/4 SD 25 10 2,637 264
LA 131 33 62,962 125
SB 7 5,860 10
Tot. 163 43 71,459 399
1979/1 SD 21 8 5,951 20
LA 166 27 68,003 275
SB 20 4,497 59
Tot. 207 35 78,451 354
1979/2 SD 32 10 4,951 42
LA 156 26 65,927 200
SB 15 2 3,865 30
Tot. 203 38 74,743 272
1979/3 SD 76 14 2,873 49
LA 128 34 45,938 38
SB 30 1 4,166 31
Tot. 234 49 52,977 118
1979/4 SD 43 8 7,962 75
LA 103 26 125,045 244
SB 20 5 3,806 57
Tot. 166 39 136,813 376
1980/1 SD 36 6 3,681 73
LA 92 33 93,893 162
SB 15 7 4,408 9
Tot. 143 46 101,982- 249
1 980/2 SD 24 8 3,693 431
LA 70 17 94,975 292
SB 15 6 5,025 35
Tot. 109 31 103,693 758
1980/3 SD 44 10 4,601 318
LA 102 30 94,998 200
SB 22 8 5,002 35
Tot. 168 48 104,601 553
1 980/4 SD 28 5 3,150 24
LA 125 29 95,974 2374
SB 12 5 4,026 16
Tot. 165 39 103,150 2414
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Year/Qrt. Unit Disch. Viol. Rpt. Oil Trans. Oil Spl.
1981/1 SD 38 13 3,507 66
LA 107 41 95,601 87
SB 10 3 3,099 43
Tot. 155 57 102,207 196
1981/2 SD 51 13 3,074 30
LA 161 45 46,739 262
SB 7 1 4,742 1
Tot. 219 59 54,555 293
1981/3 SO 60 31 2,195 164
LA 200 27 100,404 336
SB 15 5 6,000 14
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